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NOTES
THE ENTRUSTER'S RIGHT TO PROCEEDS OF SALE UNDER
SECTION 10 OF THE UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPTS ACT
THE Uniform Trust Receipts Act (UTRA)' provides a chattel security
device designed to facilitate credit transactions between financers, manufac-
turers, and dealers of consumer durables. 2 In the typical transaction the bank
or finance company (entruster) pays the manufacturer for goods sold and
delivered to the dealer (trustee), 3 receiving in return a security interest in
the goods under a trust receipt executed by the dealer.4 The trust receipt ar-
1. Reprinted in 9A UNIFORm LAws ANN. 284-317 (hereinafter cited as U.L.A.).
The Uniform Trust Receipts Act (hereinafter cited as UTRA) was approved by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1933, id. at 274, and
has been adopted by thirty-two states and remains the law of thirty-one. Pennsylvania
adopted the Uniform Commercial Code repealing the UTRA, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A
(Purdon 1954).
2. The trust receipt was originally devised by commercial banks for use in financing
of import shipments and received common law recognition as early as 1843. For the early
history of trust receipts see Frederick, The Trust Receipt as Security, 22 COLUm. L. REv.
395, 546 (1922). When the UTRA was drafted in 1933 the common law trust receipt
was being employed extensively to finance domestic shipments of automobiles and other
consumer durables. At this same period of development, however, courts treated this
device differently from state to state and the utility of the trust receipt was being curtailed
by rather sterile legal technicalities. Some courts thought that in its "true nature" the
trust receipt was just another form of pledge, chattel mortgage or conditional sale, and
consequently that a trust receipt could create a valid security interest only by conforming
to the legal requirements of the device with which it was identified. Other courts apparently
recognized what they called "tripartite" arrangements in which the dealer acquired the
goods or documents of title from the entruster, but invalidated "bipartite" arrangements
permitting acquisition directly from the manufacturer. The UTRA was drafted to obviate
this legal formalism, to promote uniformity, and to preserve the trust receipt for its
growing commercial utilization. Commissioners' Prefatory Note, Why the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act Was Drafted, 9A U.L.A. 274-77; Gilmore, Chattel Security: II, 57
YALE LJ. 761-65 (1948) ; notes 3, 4, 11. infra and accompanying text.
3. The manufacturer generally forwards bills of lading covering shipments directly
to the entruster who gives copies to the dealer in exchange for trust receipts. But when
bills of lading are forwarded first to the dealer, this departure from what was considered
a "tripartite" arrangement does not invalidate the transaction. UTRA § 2-1 (b) ; Uni-
versal Credit Co. v. Citizens State Bank, 224 Ind. 1, 64 N.E.2d 28 (1945). For detailed
discussion of the trust receipt transaction see GILmORE & BLACE, ADIMIRALTY §§ 3-21 (to
be published, Foundation Press, 1957).
4. If a statement of trust receipt financing has been properly filed, the entruster's
security interest in the goods is superior to that of all the dealer's purchasers, creditors
and lienors, UTRA § 7, except buyers in the ordinary course of trade, id. § 9-2(a);
purchasers of negotiable instruments or documents and of "as if" negotiable instruments,
id. § 9-1 (a) ; and encumbrancers whose liens arise in connection with the processing, ware-
housing, shipping, etc., of the goods, id. § 11.
A simple statement of trust receipt financing, filed with the Secretary of State by the
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rangement permits the dealer to sell the goods in the ordinary course of trade
free of the entruster's security interest,5 but requires the dealer to repay his
debt to the entruster immediately upon sale.6 As long as the dealer liquidates
his trust receipt debts in this manner he is permitted to execute new trust
receipts to finance replacement inventory, thus receiving a continuing line of
credit.7 When the dealer defaults by retaining the proceeds of sale, the UTRA
undertakes to protect the entruster; section 10 provides that his security
interest shifts to these proceeds s and survives for ten days. 9 The UTRA
thus seeks to give both dealer and financer the advantages of floating liens,
but it avoids the two features which have traditionally led courts to hold float-
ing liens illegal. 10 In the first instance, the dealer's power of sale is distinguished
from that associated with floating lien arrangements primarily by the require-
ment that his debt be immediately liquidated." Secondly, the UTRA gives
entruster, designating the dealer and containing a general description of the goods, ful-
fills all recordation requirements for one year. Id. § 13. Since this provision affords
an inexpensive (usually one dollar) and convenient filing procedure, failure to file has
not become a commercially significant problem in the field of dealer financing. Gilmore,
The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1103 (1954). But
see Note, 66 YALE L.J. 567 (1957) (discussing choice of proper place to file multistate
transaction under UTRA).
5. UTRA § 9-2(a).
6. Section 10, which shifts the entruster's security interest to the proceeds, is operative
only if the dealer has no liberty of sale, or having liberty of sale is to account for proceeds.
The entruster derives no benefit from withholding liberty of sale since under § 9-2(a) (ii)
a buyer in the ordinary course of trade takes free of the entruster's interest despite such a
limitation. In fact if the entruster does not give power of sale, and thus imposes no duty
to account, the security arrangement is more likely to be invalidated under the doctrine
of Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925). It is probably for these reasons that the
terms of the trust receipt agreement always impose on the dealer a duty to account
to the entruster for proceeds immediately upon sale. See Heindl, Trust Receipt Financing
Under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, 26 CHI.-KYEr L. REv. 197, 257 (1948).
7. In nearly all trust receipt arrangements the entruster sends a letter of credit
in favor of the dealer to the manufacturer. This instrument generally states the volume
of goods which the dealer may order during a specific period and contains the entruster's
promise to pay the manufacturer for these goods by accepting all drafts which are ac-
companied by proper shipping documents. The entruster, however, retains the right to
revoke the letter of credit, and presumably will revoke, if the dealer fails to maintain
an expected rate of repayment. See Gilmore, Chattel Security: II, 57 YALE L.J. 761-62,
768 (1948) ; McGOWAN, TRUST RECEIPTS 14-15 (1947).
8. See pages 928-31 infra.
9. See note 58 infra and accompanying text.
10. In most states liens are said to "float," and are held illegal as a fraud on creditors,
when the borrower is given power to sell collateral with no correlative duty to account
immediately to the lienor for the proceeds, and the security agreement provides that the
lien shifts to after-acquired inventory. Cohen & Gerber, Mortgages of Merchandise, 39
COLUm. L. REv. 1338 (1939) (discussing different state definitions of floating liens and
collecting cases) ; Cohen & Gerber, The After-Acquired Property Clause, 87 U. PA. L.
Rnv. 635, 656-59 (1939) (same) ; Gilmore & Axelrod, Chattel Security: I, 57 YALE L.J.
517, 534-35 (1948).
11. See note 6 supra, and authorities cited note 10 supra.
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the entruster the equivalent of a continuous security interest in a moving
stock of goods, but in contrast to a floating lien, the entruster's ten day lien
shifts not to after-acquired inventory, but to the proceeds of sale.
Despite these dissimilarities from the typical floating lien, the entruster's
claim to a lien on proceeds under section 10 may encounter serious difficulty.
The proceeds of dealer sales are usually conditional sales contracts. Since
the dealer often discounts these contracts with the entruster, the former's loan
is paid and no lien problems arise.12 In some instances, however, the dealer
assigns the contracts for value to a second bank or finance company. In these
cases, the entruster will seek to preserve his security interest by asserting a lien
under section 10 either on the conditional sales contracts or on the proceeds
received by the dealer from discounting the chattel paper. The second type
of lien presents difficult bankruptcy problems. Since the proceeds retained
by the dealer will generally be commingled with his other assets, they can
seldom be traced and identified. Because of the unclear language of section
10 and the paucity of judicial interpretation, it is as yet uncertain whether
this section authorizes a lien on unidentifiable proceeds and whether such a
lien is enforceable in bankruptcy.' 3 The entruster would therefore prefer to
establish a lien on the conditional sales contracts. In this context, he would
not be involved in bankruptcy proceedings since he claims only against the
assignee; outside of bankruptcy, a lien on such identifiable proceeds has al-
ways been held valid.1 4 Furthermore, sustaining his claim, the entruster would
receive the interest payments on the conditional sales contracts. The claim
would be challenged, however, by the assignee of the conditional sales contract,
asserting his rights as a bona fide purchaser under section 9.1' In sum, the
practical value of the entruster's security interest depends on two unsettled
issues: whether the assignee can prevail over the entruster claiming under
section 10 and thereby retain the conditional sales contracts; and, if so,
whether the entruster can still retrieve this loss by claiming a section 10 lien
on the unidentifiable proceeds of the sale.
To defeat the entruster's claim to the conditional sales contracts, the assignee
argues that he fits within section 9-1(a), which provides that a good faith
purchaser for value of instruments which "are by common practice purchased
12. The principal reason that banks and finance companies enter into trust receipt
arrangements is to obtain conditional sales contracts from dealers. Trust receipt financing
is carried out at comparatively low rates with little profit to the financer, while the financ-
ing of consumer sales under conditional sales contracts is a highly profitable enterprise.
Thus, in most instances, dealer financing will be discontinued when a dealer fails to assign
substantially all of this consumer paper to his entruster. Gilmore, The Commercial
Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1102 (1954).
13. In the only case in which this problem was presented, the court held that § 10
did establish a valid consensual lien on unidentifiable proceeds. In the Matter of Harpeth
Motors, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 863 (M.D. Tenn. 1955).
14. Universal Credit Co. v. Citizens State Bank, 224 Ind. 1, 64 N.E.2d 28 (1945).
See cases cited note 16 infra.
15. See notes 16 and 17 infra.
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and sold as if negotiable" holds such instruments free of the entruster's interest
if he took them "by transfer in the customary manner." The few cases which
have considered the assignee's section 9 argument have disagreed as to its
merits. Some courts have upheld the entruster's claim, reasoning that section
9-1 (a) is not applicable to conditional sales contracts. 1 6 But several cases have
allowed the assignee of the chattel paper to avoid the entruster's claim.17 The
section can easily be construed to compel the latter result. Since section
9-1 (a)'s phrase "purchased and sold as if negotiable" is not specifically defined
by the statute, its meaning may be inferred from usage; section 9-1 (a)'s
insistance on a transfer "in the customary manner" may suggest that an
instrument which is transferred in the manner in which negotiable instruments
are transferred is one which is "purchased and sold as if negotiable." If, as
seems likely, the "customary manner" of transfer is by indorsement and delivery,
conditional sales contracts, which are customarily so transferred, are "pur-
chased and sold as if negotiable." The good faith assignee for value then is
entitled to retain these "as if negotiable" contracts if he took them by indorse-
ment and delivery.' 8
16. Canandaigua Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Commercial Credit Corp., 285 App.
Div. 7, 135 N.Y.S.2d 66 (4th Dep't 1954) ; General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Associates
Discount Corp., 38 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Mun. Ct. 1942), rev'd on other grounds, 267 App. Div.
1032, 48 N.Y.S.2d 242 (4th Dep't 1944) ; B.S.C. Corp. v. Colonial Discount Co., 169 Misc.
711, 8 N.Y.S.2d 65 (City Ct. 1938).
17. Citizens Nat'l Trust and Say. Bank v. Beverly Finance Co., 127 Cal. App. 2d
835, 273 P.2d 714 (1954); Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. National
Funding Corp., 45 Cal. App. 2d 320, 114 P.2d 49 (1941) ; Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Universal
Credit Co., 259 App. Div. 955,20 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (3d Dep't 1940). See also North American
Acceptance Corp. v. Northern Ill. Corp., 347 Ill. App. 89, 106 N.E.2d 197 (1952) (§
9-1 (a) held applicable by implication but entruster prevailed since assignee was not
good faith purchaser for value).
The assignee's alternative argument that he was a buyer in the ordinary course of trade
under § 9-2(a) was indorsed in Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. National
Funding Corp., supra, but rejected in B.S.C. Corp. v. Colonial Discount Co., supra note 16.
18. Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057,
1103-04 (1954).
Section 9-1 (a) applies only to "instruments." Section 1 defines "instrument" as a
"credit... instrument of a sort marketed in the ordinary course of business or finance, of
which the trustee, after the trust receipt transaction, appears by virtue of possession and
the face of the instrument to be the owner." Arguably, conditional sales contracts are
within this definition. Id. at 1104. Alternatively, it may be argued that § 9-1 (a) usage,
"instruments ... sold as if negotiable" is not meant to be tested by the instrument definition
of § 1.
In either event the strong similarity between the basic characteristics of negotiable
instruments and conditional sales contracts further suggests that the latter are in fact
"purchased and sold as if negotiable." The presumptions of NEGOTAXLE INSTRUMENTS
LAw §§ 24, 16, 14, 59, implementing a policy of free negotiability, encourage the transferee
to accept an instrument "complete and regular on its face" as evidence of a valid debt
substantially free from latent defects. The assignee of a conditional sales contract
similarly relies on its regularity. Neither the transferee of a negotiable instrument nor
the assignee of a conditional sales contract takes free from all defenses. The assignee
may be subject to consumer's defenses such as breach of warranty; the transferee is
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Commercial policy favors a construction that would place conditional sales
contracts within the "as if negotiable" category of section 9-1(a). A con-
siderable body of statutory and case law denies full negotiability to conditional
sales contracts.19 But the purpose of denying full negotiability is to enable
the consumer to assert against the assignee-financer those defenses which
would be good against the dealer. This purpose should not be persuasive
in the totally different context of two institutional lenders asserting competing
equities of ownership.20 In fact it would be more to the consumer's advantage
for the assignee to take free of the entruster's lien. Allowing the entruster
to maintain his security interest in this paper after assignment would tend
to decrease competition among consumer credit financers, and consequently to
exert an unfavorable influence on interest rates charged consumers.21 On the
other hand, the interpretation of section 9-1 (a) suggested above would enhance
the mobility of chattel paper, thus serving the interest of the consumer credit
industry which is substantially dependent on such ready assignability.
22
Protecting the assignee's interest does introduce the possibility of abuse.
Most cases litigated dealing with the relative rights of the entruster and assignee
subject to such real defenses as fraud on the drawer or maker. For so-called "real de-
fenses" to negotiable instruments, see id. § 55. In each case the transferee or assignee re-
lies on the regularity of his instrument; real defects are considered as risks of the enter-
prise rather than as risks of the particular transaction.
An additional argument may be premised on the fact that under the law of most states
promissory notes do not lose their negotiable character when attached to conditional
sales contracts. Gilmore, supra at 1097 & n.119. Section 9-1(a) clearly applies to ne-
gotiable instruments. Consequently, even if it is held not to apply to conditional sales
contracts, the assignee who loses his claim to the entruster could conceivably still retain
the negotiable notes. Since the common law rule is that the security follows the note, id. at
1081-82 & n.83, a construction of § 9-1 (a) which deemed it inapplicable to conditional
sales contracts would be of little value to the entruster and would promote duplication
of law suits.
19. Conditional sales contracts do not meet the requisites of negotiability as set out in
NEGOTIABLE INSTu rENTs LAw §§ 1-10. See, e.g., Gale & Co. v. Wallace, 210 Ark. 161,
163, 194 S.W.2d 881, 882 (1946) ; General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Davis, 169 Kan.
220, 218 P.2d 181 (1950).
20. Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057,
1101 (1954).
21. Prohibitive financing rates charged consumers on installment loans under con-
ditional sales contracts have long been a serious problem. Note, 60 YALE L.J. 1218
(1951); Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J.
1057 (1954). A partial solution has been effected in some states under statutes protecting
the consumer's right to choose between financers and requiring dealers adequately to
inform consumers as to all elements of the financing arrangement. See, e.g., N.Y. PERs.
PROP. LAW §§ 301-11. See Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Comwercial
Code, 16 LAW & CONT~mP. PnoB. 27, 37 (1951); Donaldson, An Analysis of Retail
Installment Sales Legislation, 19 RocKy MT. L. Rzv. 135 (1946). This desirable trend
could be derogated, however, by allowing entrusters to monopolize dealer consumer paper.
UNIFoRm CommERCIAL CODE § 9-306, comment 2(c) ; id. § 9-308 (1956 Recommendations
of the Editorial Board) ; Note, 61 YALE L.J. 718, 727 (1952).




of a conditional sales contract arise when the dealer corporation has purported
to sell a trust receipted automobile on credit to its president, a relative or
an employee.23 This enables the dealer who assigns the fictitious vendee's
conditional sales contract to a second finance company to obtain two loans on
the same security, which never leaves the premises. Under the UTRA the
entruster must normally bear the risk of a dealer's dishonesty since he is
deemed to be in the best position to scrutinize the dealer's activities.2 But
even with frequent and careful investigation it is impossible for the entruster
to prevent such fictitious sales. On the other hand, the assignee, whose normal
inquiry about the automobile consumer will often disclose whether he has any
connection with the dealer corporation, is in a relatively good position to
prevent this type of double financing.
25
The good faith proviso of section 9 is, however, a sufficient safeguard against
abuse. Section 9 protects the second financer's claim to the conditional sales
contract only when he can successfully meet the burden of persuasion as to
his own good faith.20 Actual notice of the entruster's lien on the specific item
sold prevents the assignee from proving good faith.2 7 However, the assignee
seldom has such notice; in practice, he may only know that the dealer generally
engages in trust receipt financing. In a bona fide sale, this kind of notice should
be irrelevant and the assignee should be held in good faith.28 Since the chattel
leaves the dealer's premises after a bona fide sale, the assignee may expect that
the entruster in policing the dealer's inventory will learn that the chattel is
missing, will demand an accounting and be paid from the amount given by
the assignee to the dealer for the conditional sales contract. But if the assignee
knows that the sale is fictitious and has notice that the dealer is usually financed
through trust receipts, his participtation in the scheme demonstrates his own
dishonesty. If he should have reason initially to suspect a close relationship
23. The seven cases reported in notes 16 and 17 mtpra are all cases of fictitious sales.
24. Commissioner's Prefatory Note, 9A U.L.A. 278.
25. See SEIDMAN, FINANCE COMPANIES AND FACTORS 129 (1949).
26. See page 924 supra. North Am. Acceptance Corp., v. Northern Ill. Corp., 347
Ill. App. 89, 106 N.E2d 197 (1952).
27. Gilmore, The Commerical Doctrine of Good Faith PurchaSe, 63 YALE L.J. 1057,
1105 (1954) (reasoning from § 9-1(a) which provides that "filing under this act shall
not be deemed to constitute notice of the entruster's interest to purchasers in good
faith . . .," that a purchaser with actual notice of the entruster's security interest cannot
retain the conditional sales contract); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Associates
Discount Corp., 38 N.Y.S.2d 972, 978-79 (Mun. Ct. 1942) (dictum; same), rev'd, 267 App.
Div. 1032, 48 N.Y.S.2d 242 (4th Dep't 1944). Cf. B.C.S. Corp. v. Colonial Discount Co.,
169 Misc. 711, 713, 8 N.Y.S.2d 65, 67 (City Ct. 1938) (chattel mortgage).
28. All of the cases considering this notice problem in the context of a bona fide sale
transaction have held that the assignee's knowledge of the dealer's general practice
to engage in trust receipt financing does not constitute notice that the particular auto-
mobile under the conditional sales contract is subject to a trust receipt lien. Commercial
Credit Co. v. Barney Motor Co., 10 Cal. 2d 718, 76 P.2d 1181 (1938); Tharp v. San
Joaquin Valley Securities Co., 20 Cal. App. 2d 20, 66 P.2d 230 (1937). Cf. Peoples
Finance and Thrift Co. v. Bowman, 58 Cal. App. 2d 729, 137 P.2d 729 (1943).
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between dealer and vendee and makes no further attempt to determine the
nature of the sale and to discover whether the automobile is entrusted, his par-
ticipation at least evidences a lack of good faith. When the claim arises out
of a sale which was in fact fictitious, there should be a presumption of bad faith,
rebuttable by a showing either that the assignee had no reason to suspect a
close relationship between dealer and vendee, or that after exercising reason-
able care the assignee could not discover both that the automobile was en-
trusted property and that the vendee was fictitious. This presumption is
consistent with the policy of the UTRA, since it is premised not on the assignee's
assumption of the risk of dealer dishonesty, but on the assignee's own bad
faith in participating in the scheme when a reasonable financer would have
made further inquiries.
If the entruster loses his claim to the conditional sales contract the extent
of his recovery from a defaulting dealer may often depend on how his interest
in unidentifiable proceeds is classified in federal bankruptcy proceedings. Pro-
ceeds which remain subject to the entruster's claim under section 10 of the
UTRA are those realized by the dealer from the sale of entrusted goods or
the assignment of consumer paper. When the dealer is in default it is likely
that bankruptcy is imminent and that these cash proceeds are commingled
with his other assets and are unidentifiable. Under 10(b) :
"... the entruster [is] entitled, to the extent to which and as against
all classes of persons as to whom his security interest was valid at the time
of disposition by the trustee, . . . to any proceeds or the value of any
proceeds (whether such proceeds are identifiable or not) of the goods,
.. . if said proceeds were received by the trustee within ten days prior
to either ... the filing of a petition in bankruptcy ... by or against the
trustee, or demand made by the entruster for prompt accounting; and to
a priority to the amount of such proceeds or value. .. ." [Emphasis added.]
If this section is interpreted to establish for the entruster only a priority in
distribution of the dealer's assets it would be of no value since section 64 of
the Bankruptcy Act eliminates state-created priorities.20 The entruster as
a priority holder would be relegated to the position of an unsecured creditor.
If 10(b) creates a statutory lien within the meaning of section 67c of the
Bankruptcy Act his claim would probably be similarly unsecured; section
67c(2) invalidates statutory liens on personalty not accompanied by "posses-
sion of" or by "levy upon" the property subject to the lien before filing of the
petition in bankruptcy.3 0 However, a third possibility is that section 10(b)
29. 52 STAT. 874 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1952); Halpert v. Industrial
Comm'r, 147 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Strom v. Peikes, 123 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1941) ; 3
COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1 64.01, at 2052 (14th ed., Moore & Oglebay 1941) (hereinafter
cited as CoLLIER).
30. 66 STAT. 428, 11 U.S.C. § 107(c) (2) (1952) (allowing the trustee in bankruptcy
to preserve the lien for the benefit of the estate) ; 4 COLLIER ff 67.20 [5], at 195. In the
Matter of Quaker City Uniform Co., 238 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1956) (original classification
and invalidation of chattel mortgage as a statutory lien modified on rehearing; opinion
reserved as to whether chattel mortgage creates statutory lien).
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authorizes a consensual lien which would entitle the entruster to first claim
on the bankrupt's assets.
Section 10(b) does not create a statutory lien within the meaning of the
Bankruptcy Act. Statutory liens are those not merely regulated, but created
by statute for the benefit of particular economic classes.31 Thus section 67b's
protection of statutory lien holders is limited in application to liens in favor of
"employees, contractors, mechanics, landlords or other classes of persons .... ,,32
It is unlikely that the term "other classes of persons" is intended to include
creditors, such as entrusters, whose security interest, even though regulated
by statute, is obtained through a private agreement between the parties.
33
Congressional intent further indicates that security devices such as the trust
receipt are not statutory liens. Section 67b exempts statutory liens from the
voiding provisions of section 60.34 This exemption would be illogical for ex-
tensively used inventory liens. In addition, section 60 was amended in 1950
to make trust receipts, anlong other security devices, less vulnerable to invali-
dation as preferential transfers; this amendment would have been unnecessary
if 67b already preserved trust receipts liens. 35 It therefore seems clear that
31. 4 COLLIER ff 67.20[2], at 184.
32. 30 STrT. 564 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 107(b) (1952).
33. See In the Matter of Tele-Tone Radio Corp., 133 F. Supp. 739, 746-48 (D.N.J.
1955) (holding that factor's lien is not statutory) ; 4 COLLIER f" 67.20 [2], at 184-85
& n.16b (stating that the UTRA lien is not statutory). But see In re Rand Mining Co.,
71 F. Supp. 724, 727 (S.D. Cal. 1947) (dictum that the UTRA lien is statutory) ; Hanna,
Preferences in Bankruptcy, 15 U. CHi. L. REv. 311, 320 (1948).
34. 30 STAT. 564 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 107(b) (1952).
35. In 1950 § 60a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act was amended, 64 STAT. 24, 11 U.S.C.
§ 96(a) (1952), to change the standard by which the perfection of liens would be tested.
Btfore this amendment, transfers were deemed to have occurred when they became so
perfected that no bona fide purchaser from the dealer could create rights in the property
superior to the rights of the transferee. Since the entruster may never obtain rights
superior to that of a buyer from the dealer in the ordinary course of trade, UTRA §
9-2(a), the entruster's lien could never attain the required perfection. His lien was
therefore deemed to have been transferred to the entruster on the eve of bankruptcy,
which made the transfer "for or on account of an antecedent debt." The transfer was
then vulnerable as a voidable preference. See Bankruptcy Act § 60a(1), b, 30 STAT. 562
(1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1952). When the transfer was voided, the entruster
no longer had a lien to shield from the preferential transfer provisions any money or
property received in repayment. In re Harvey Distributing Co., 88 F. Supp. 466 (E.D.
Va. 1950), rev'd sub nor. Coin Mach. Acceptance Corp. v. O'Donnell, 192 F.2d 773 (4th
Cir. 1951). This commercially undesirable result was a major reason for amending § 60(a)
to substitute a judicial lien creditor test for that of a bona fide purchaser. The entruster,
in most instances, obtains rights in property superior to that of a judicial lien creditor.
Under this test, therefore, his lien may be so perfected by filing that the transfer of the
security interest is deemed to have occurred at the time the trust receipt transaction
created the debt. Coin Mach. Acceptance Corp. v. O'Donnell, supra at 776 (finding
from the history of the 1950 amendment that Congress had originally intended the result
prescribed by the amendment); see S. RE'. No. 72, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 3 (1949);
Kupfer, The Recent Amendment of Section 60(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, 24 Rn'. J. 86
(1950) ; MacLachian, Preference Redefined, 63 HALv. L. REv. 1390 (1950).
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section 67b's protection of "statutory liens" does not extend to the entruster's
claim under section 10(b). And, while it is possible that "statutory lien" has
a different meaning in 67c, the Bankruptcy Act suggests neither a different
definition nor any reason for construing the 67c term differently. 30 The in-
validating clauses of that section should not, therefore, apply to a section 10(b)
lien.
The most reasonable interpretation is that section 10(b) of the UTRA
authorizes a consensual lien on unidentifiable proceeds. Under the terms of
this section the entruster is accorded the same rights in proceeds as he had
in the goods; he is entitled to proceeds, identifiable or not, "to the extent to
which and as against all classes of persons as to whom his security interest was
vaild at the time of disposition" of the goods by 'the dealer. The entruster's
"security interest . . . at the time of disposition" has been held to be a con-
sensual lien on the trust receipted goods ;37 the "classes of persons" as against
whom this lien has been held valid includes the trustee in bankruptcy.38 Hence,
section 10(b) provides the entruster with a lien on unidentifiable proceeds
intended to be enforceable in bankruptcy proceedings.39
The last clause of section 10(b), "... and to a priority. . ," should in no
way weaken or obscure the entruster's rights.40 In some instances a debt may
be secured by a lien as well as entitled to a priority.4 ' The last clause of section
10(b) was designed to effect just this result. 42 When the UTRA was promul-
36. See In the Matter of Tele-Tone Radio Corp., 133 F. Supp. 739 (D.N.J. 1955);
Note, 69 HAav. L. REv. 756 (1956). Classifying the UTRA lien as a statutory lien would
produce further undesirable and arbitrary results. Since 67c(2) voids statutory liens
unaccompanied by possession, the utility of all inventory devices, to which this holding
would necessarily be applicable, would be impaired. Accordingly, repossession of inven-
tory would be encouraged, deterring an orderly disposition of the bankrupt's estate. Note,
69 HARv. L. REv. 756, 758 (1956).
37. Taylor v. Quittner, 218 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1954); Chichester v. Commercial
Credit Co., 37 Cal. App. 2d 439, 99 P.2d 1083 (1940) ; Donn v. Auto Dealers Inv. Co.,
385 Ill. 211, 52 N.E.2d 695 (1944).
38. Taylor v. Quittner, supra note 37; Chichester v. Commercial Credit Co., supra
note 37.
39. In addition, § 18 states that the provisions of the UTRA should be uniformly
and consistently interpreted. Section 10(b) entities the entruster to proceeds "whether
.. identifiable or not," and all relevant cases have held that the entruster has a lien on
identifiable proceeds. Taylor v. Quittner, 218 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1954) ; Universal Credit
Co. v. Citizens State Bank, 224 Ind. 1, 64 N.E.2d 28 (1945). Consequently, a uniform
and consistent interpretation should require that the entruster's right to unidentifiable
proceeds be given the same effect.
40. In the Matter of Harpeth Motors, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 863 (M.D. Tenn. 1955)
(overruling a referee's holding that § 10 provided a mere priority).
41. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act § 64a, 30 STAT. 563 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §
104(a) (1952); § 67b, 30 STAT. 564 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 107(b) (1952);
§ 67c, 66 STAT. 428, 11 U.S.C. § 107 (c) (1952) (rent, wages and tax claims may have
both lien and priority) ; 3 COLLIE 64.02, at 2056 (discussing lien and priority of tax
claims).




gated in 1933 the Bankruptcy Act did recognize state-created priorities.43 Not
until five years later did the Chandler Amendment invalidate them, causing
the word priority to become a term of art.44 In view of this historical back-
ground the obsolete usage employed in the last clause of 10(b) should not
impair the lien conferred by the first part of this section. Furthermore, the
standard distinction between a priority and a valid lien is that the former
arises only upon bankruptcy, affording a narrow right to payment at a certain
relative point in the distribution of a debtor's property, while the latter entails
a right to enforcement independent of bankruptcy. 45 It is thus apparent that
the first part of 10(b), giving the entruster a right to proceeds irrespective of
bankruptcy if he makes a timely demand for prompt accounting, provides a
lien rather than a priority.
Federal bankruptcy courts should be bound by this interpretation of state
law which gives the entruster a lien on the value of proceeds. Section 70 of
the Bankruptcy Act and interpretive comments provide that the trustee takes
the property in the bankrupt's possession subject to all valid liens. 40 Never-
theless, the unique dimensions of the entruster's lien on proceeds may raise
conceptual difficulties. Since 10(b) entitles the entruster to the "value" of
proceeds, 47 he has a charge against the trustee in bankruptcy on any free
assets of the dealer-assets that were not originally subject to the entruster's
security interest. The novelty of this 10(b) lien has troubled some commen-
tators. It has been argued that the entruster can claim the value of proceeds
only as a reclamation petitioner, on the theory that he is the beneficiary of a
trust.48 If this were true, standard trust law would require that the entruster
identify and trace proceeds of sale.49 The proceeds are often cash, and it may
be impossible to trace them into a particular bank account or newly acquired
property. However, the UTRA clearly dispels the trust analogy. Section 1
declares that "[t]he use of the word 'Trustee' . . . shall not be interpreted or
construed to imply the existence of a trust . . ."; section 10(b) eliminates any
identification requirement.50 In bankruptcy proceedings state law is deter-
43. 30 STAT. 563 (1898) (later amended by 52 STAT. 874 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 104
(1952)) ; see note 29 supra and accompanying text.
44. Ibid.
45. 3 COLLIER ff 64.02, at 2055-56; In the Matter of Harpeth Motors, Inc., 135 F. Supp.
863 (M.D. Tenn. 1955) (quoting from COLLIER) ; cf. Note, 51 YArax L.J. 863, 868 (1942);
Prudence Realization Corp. v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89 (1942).
46. 30 STAT. 565 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1952) ; 4 COLLIER 70.04, at 947 & n.20
(collecting cases).
47. See page 928 supra.
48. Gilmore, Chattel Security: II, 57 YALE L.J. 761, 768 (1948) suggests that
the trust analogy may be necessary to support the entruster's claim to proceeds. See
also In the Matter of Harpeth Motors, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 863, 869 (M.D. Tenn. 1955)
(disagreeing with, although not overruling, the referee's contention that the entruster's
claim could not be enforced unless he traced proceeds of sale).
49. 4 COLLIER 1 70.25, at 1134; 4 Scorr, TRUSTS § 521 (2d ed. 1956).
50. In the Matter of Harpeth Motors, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 863, 869 (M.D. Tenn. 1955);
Heindl, Trust Receipt Financing Under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, 26 CHI.-KENT
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minative as to the existence of a trust and tracing requirements, unless it sub-
stantially departs from the general norm of trust law.51 Certainly the pro-
visions of a uniform law adopted in thirty-one states cannot be considered
aberrational and should be followed by federal bankruptcy courtsY2  More-
over, normally state law, not the Bankruptcy Act, also determines what liens
are valid, for the act nowhere states any affirmative requirements of a valid
lien.5 3 It is true that liens defined as valid by state law often are, or lead to,
transfers of property interests which may be voidable under the Bankruptcy
Act's express provisions against preferential and fraudulent transfers." But
the entruster can meet these requirements by filing under the UTRA. 5 When
he does, the Bankruptcy Act imposes no further obstacle to a section 10(b)
lien on free assets of the bankrupt dealer.56
The validity of the UTRA lien on the value of proceeds, however, should
be conditioned on the entruster's prompt prosecution of his claim.57 Section
10 makes the entruster's demand for a prompt accounting within ten days of
sale necessary for the preservation of his security interest.15 A demand for
L. REv. 197, 258 (1948) ; Bogert, The Effect of the Trust Receipts Act, 3 U. CH I. L. REv.
26, 37 (1935).
51. Even though Congress might preempt state law in this area, it has not done so.
4 CoLi.a 70.25, at 1148-49. Bankruptcy courts, consequently, must refer to state law on
these questions. Ibid. They may, however, overrule any state law which, if applied, would
effect a state insolvency rule rather than the bankruptcy rule of distribution. Ibid. See In
re Tate-Jones & Co., 85 F. Supp. 971 (W.D. Pa. 1,949) (citing COLLIER) ; ef. Prudence
Realization Corp. v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89 (1942).
52. See note 51 supra. By enacting the 1950 amendments to § 60, Congress has, in fact,
evidenced an intent not to use its bankruptcy power to preempt state rules on trust receipts.
See note 35 supra.
53. 4 COLLIER 11 70.70, at 1343-47 (dollecting cases).
54. See Bankruptcy Act § 60a, b, 30 STAT. 562 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (b) (1952);
§ 67d, 30 STAT. 564 (1893), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1952) ; § 70c, 30 STAT. 566 (1898), 11
U.S.C. § 110(c) (1952) ; § 70e, 30 STAT. 566 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § ll0(e) (1952).
55. If the entruster's security interest is valid under the UTRA and he has properly
filed, it may not be avoided under: § 67d (provided the entruster has given fair consider-
ation); § 70c, 4 CoLLIER 1 70.58, at 1307; § 70e, 4 id. ff 70.85; or § 60a, 4 id. 70.58, at
1308 & n.27a, and see note 35 supra. See also 3 COLLIER 1 60.45, at 958-59 (discussing
whether filing must take place within twenty-one days after transaction under § 60a(7),
or within thirty days under UTRA §§ 7, 8, 9; Note, 66 YALE L.J. 567, 575 & n.40 (1957)
(same).
56. 4 COLLR f 70.70, at 1344-46 (collecting cases).
57. Dealers often take used cars from consumers as part of the retail price of entrusted
automobiles. When the dealer fails to repay his entire debt on the new car, the entruster
should be permitted to maintain a security interest in this type of proceeds without
immediately prosecuting his claim only if he secures a chattel mortgage, a new trust
receipt (in states where this is possible), or some other security device on the used
automobile.
58. Although the period of time during which the entruster's lien on proceeds survives
before he demands an accounting ostensibly varies under § 10(a), § 10(b) and § 10(c),
it is unlikely that § 10(a) or § 10(c) will be interpreted to permit the entruster to remain
safely inactive for appreciably longer than the ten day limit of § 10(b). The effect of
[Vol : 66
NOTES
prompt accounting has been held to mean that the entruster must demand
immediate delivery of the proceeds from the dealer.5 9 But neither the UTRA
nor case law has considered whether the entruster's lien should be con-
tingent upon any further action if the dealer fails to comply with this demand.
The most reasonable construction of the demand for accounting requirement
would necessitate that the entruster diligently bring suit for the proceeds upon
the dealer's default or lose his security interest in them. Since a creditor
knows that cash proceeds are easily dissipated in the course of business, the
entruster who permits a dealer to continue business without promptly enforcing
his lien, depends, just as any unsecured creditor, on the dealer's honesty and
continued solvency rather than on his collateral. Thus he should be placed
in no better position than unsecured creditors in bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy
proceedings. In either type of proceeding failure to sue immediately after a
prompt demand for an accounting should dissolve the entruster's lien, except
if a petition in bankruptcy was filed by or against the dealer within ten days
after sale. 0° Outside of bankruptcy, if an unsecured creditor effects a prior
attachment on property of the dealer, the entruster should be compelled to take
effective action adverse to that creditor's interest in order to maintain a superior
lien on this property.0 1
Once the entruster's lien on the value of cash proceeds is conditioned on his
diligent enforcement it is not at all inequitable to accord him the favored status
of a secured creditor. Because the entruster is usually the dealer's most signifi-
this time limit is to force the entruster to police the dealer's activities diligently. Section
10(c) may seem to extend this time limit when the proceeds of sale are identifiable.
The entruster is held to a waiver of his security interest if he fails to demand an account-
ing within ten days after his "knowledge" that such proceeds existed. But, since the
entruster is forced to maintain constant surveillance over the dealer in order to preserve
his security interest in unidentifiable proceeds, he will probably be held to at least con-
structive knowledge of the existence of identifiable proceeds shortly after they are re-
ceived by the dealer.
Section 10(a), which gives the entruster a security interest in debts owing to the
dealer by reason of the sale of collateral, apparently does not condition this right upon
any affirmative action by the entruster. This section becomes important in the rather
unusual occurrence of a dealer retaining a conditional sales contract. The entruster may
then attempt to claim this form of identifiable proceeds under § 10(a) and subsequently
claim the installment payments without showing that he made a timely demand for an
accounting after the dealer initially received this consumer paper. Since the Commis-
sioners' Prefatory Note, 9A U.L.A. 282, explains that the act "deprives the entruster
of the altogether improper possibility of acting like a mere creditor while things go
well, but insisting on his rights ... if things go badly," it is quite unlikely that § 10(a)
was intended to permit the entruster to act "like a mere creditor" indefinitely. The
most reasonable conclusion, consequently, is that the general ten day period common to
§§ 10(b) and (c) is applicable to the entruster's rights under" § 10(a) as well.
59. Peoples Finance and Thrift Co. v. Bowman, 58 Cal. App. 2d 729, 734-35, 137
P.2d 729, 731-32 (1943).
60. See UTRA § 10(b), supra page 928.
61. Such action may include intervening in the other creditor's suit (in states where
possible, CLARK, CODE PLEADING 420-23 (2d ed. 1947)), enjoining the other creditor's
action, or bringing a bill to marshal the liens and sell the property.
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cant creditor, in terms of importance to the business and of dollar amount,
the substantial risks of dealer insolvency lie with him rather than with the un-
secured creditors. 62 For this reason the entruster takes a number of measures
to protect his interest. He gives notice of his claim by recording a statement
of inventory financing 63 and conducts an extensive examination into the busi-
ness background of the dealer.64 He arranges for regular physical inspections
of the dealer's trust receipted inventory, which are intensified if signs of trouble
are disclosed, 6 5 and makes a prompt demand for repayment each time col-
lateral is sold. 66 The unsecured creditors, on the other hand, do not customarily
take any of these precautions. Moreover, the entruster has entered into the
financing arrangement relying ultimately for payment upon his security interest
in the value of proceeds. He expects to be paid an amount equal to the whole-
sale cost of the goods from the proceeds of sale, whereas the unsecured creditors
can expect satisfaction only from the mark-up retained by the dealer. Thus if
unsecured creditors have depended upon any specific part of the dealer's assets
it has been on net receipts-income above cost of goods sold-rather than
on gross receipts which, to the greatest extent, have been made possible by
the entruster. Therefore, since the entruster does lose his lien on the goods
themselves, 67 and should lose his claim to a conditional sales contract taken
in good faith by another finance company,68 he should be accorded a security
interest in the value of proceeds upon which he has relied and against which
he has diligently proceeded.
62. See Hanna, Preferences in Bankruptcy, 15 U. CHI. L. REv. 311, 314-15 (1948).
63. See note 4 supra. But see Note, 66 YALE L.J. 567, 574 & n.31 (1957) (collecting
authorities which question the value of notice filing).
64. SEIDMAN, FINANCE COMPANIES AND FACTORS 104-06 (1949).
65. See id. at 97-98; Heindl, supra note 50, at 259.
66. See note 58 supra.
67. UTRA § 9-2(a).
68. See notes 15-28 supra and accompanying text.
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